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Introduction
Since the reform and open-door policy began in 1978, China’s citieshave witnessed increasing wealth and inequality as two sides of thesame coin. Scholars agree on the interrelation of new market-eco-
nomic elements amplified by China’s integration into the world and the
transformation of once socialist institutions yielding a “new urban
poverty.” (1) However, except for studies on pre-communist times, (2) research
on beggars (3) in contemporary China is still in the preliminary stages.
Dorothy Solinger and Eric Henry stress the exclusion of rural migrants from
the country’s economic ascendancy and how they resort to informal activ-
ities such as panhandling. (4) Chinese discussions concentrate on manage-
ment aspects, with questions on the efficiency of the governmental relief
system, legal regulations, illegal panhandling organisations, and the involve-
ment of child abuse. (5) Rare empirical data is often gained through or in co-
operation with the governmental Rescue Stations responsible for beggars
or considering their point of view. (6)
This study benefits from the insights and quantitative data of preceding
research to complement its own results. However, the following analysis
will depart from the perspective on beggars as mere victims or disruptive
factors of China’s reforms. In contrast to looking at poverty as a fix living
situation, I focus on both dynamic mechanisms of exclusion and related
contestation, not only explaining higher-level rationales but also the active
strategies of beggars in everyday life. In this context, I emphasise the sig-
nificance of space. Asking for alms in a deserted place does not make
much sense; beggars depend on “publicness” not only for their own access
but also to meet numerous possible almsgivers. As public space is the most
important economic resource for surviving by panhandling, my focus lies
on the respective conflict between beggars and local government actors.
The main questions are: How and why do government actors refuse or
allow beggars access to public space? How and why do beggars appropri-
ate public space to receive alms and adapt their strategies? Furthermore,
I will put this example of contestation into the wider context of urban
public space in contemporary China. The metropolis of Guangzhou – a
vanguard of reform and urban development in the South – is presented
as a case study. 
Urban public space is a space where people come together; a space of so-
cial communication, visibility, and encounter. Although often defined by its
openness and accessibility, (7) “public space is always and inescapably a prod-
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uct of social negotiation and contest.” (8) In transforming China, local gov-
ernments strongly influence its construction and governance. With policies,
propaganda, and personnel, they try to determine access, usage, and be-
haviour to gain political and economic profits. At the same time, panhan-
dlers depend on popular and visible places for daily survival, challenging the
government’s version of an ideal public space. According to Henri Lefebvre,
this conflict reflects the two modes of socially producing space: domination
and control to create “spaces of representation” reflecting and strengthening
the power of elites versus “appropriation” and practices of everyday life serv-
ing the needs of various social groups. (9) Appropriation refers to the contin-
ued interaction between human and space. Individuals or social groups gain
material/financial, social/psychological, cultural, or political resources (10)
while (re)creating, changing, and adding to the multiple socio-spatial mean-
ings and the plurality of space. (11) Beggars appropriate space through acts
of begging, which according to David Schak “is to ask someone for food or
money as charity or with no serious intention of repaying it.” (12) Moreover,
they resort to a “panhandling repertoire” (13) consisting of contact initiation
and strategies to avoid punishment. (14) Bertolt Brecht most famously
pointed out the necessity that “the poorest among the poor may acquire
the sort of appearance that [can] still touch the more and more hardening
hearts.” (15) In this paper, begging acts are considered as performances of au-
thenticity and deservingness. Such acts differentiate from other forms of
street performances as they focus on evoking compassion. 
I argue that panhandlers answer the threat of expulsion through perform-
ances and actively participate in the social creation of public space. Whereas
absolute exclusion is rare, rising barriers require higher investments in these
performances, taking even more resources from the panhandling poor. The
trends of public order are not unidirectional, however. Beggars navigate be-
tween several contextual borders composed by China’s religious renaissance;
the discourse on deserving, undeserving, and dangerous beggars; and the
moral legitimacy of the government versus the imagination of a successful,
“modern,” and “civilised” city. This conflict shows the everyday production
of “spaces of representation” by government actors on the micro level where
economic incentives merge with aspirations for political prestige. 
Methodology
The focus of the fieldwork relied on two different sites in four districts in
Guangzhou (Yuexiu, Liwan, Haizhu, and Huangpu): a) public space at reli-
gious institutions including temples and churches, and at special events
such as temple fairs; b) areas of consumption and leisure-time activities
such as shopping streets. Both sites attract the highest number of beggars
and show contestation strategies most clearly. The data are derived from
non-participant observation and 27 qualitative, semi-structured interviews
conducted with 22 beggars during November 2011, May/August/Septem-
ber 2012, and January to March 2013. With ages ranging from 20 to 70
years, four cases were female, and all but one were rural migrants. Further-
more, 24 pictures of posters and street writings of (unknown) beggars were
taken during the same time frame.
Fieldwork on panhandling and public order is challenged by the sensitivity
of the topic and the approachability of panhandlers. To gain their trust and
to support a relaxed atmosphere, I conducted interviews in a familiar envi-
ronment, and did not record but took notes right after the encounter. The
semi-structured questions were open for longer or shorter narrations. Fur-
thermore, contacts with representatives of governmental organisations were
limited to lower level security personnel. Additionally, I conversed with
monks and nuns, trash collectors, fortune tellers, and “vagrants” (people
without a defined occupation) as they dealt with beggars or had been
treated similarly (altogether 13 interviews). (16) This qualitative material was
complemented with further written sources in Chinese such as official re-
ports, regulations and announcements, newspaper articles, and academic
publications.
Public space in urban China
Is public space in China increasing or decreasing? In this academic discus-
sion, the answers depend on the point of comparison – the communist past
or capitalist present. On the one hand, political domination over everyday
life was reduced in the course of opening and reforming the country. The
increase of individual free time, average income, urban anonymity, diversi-
fication of lifestyles, and self-expression have together built the demand for
more green space and parks, pedestrian streets and open squares, enjoying
outdoor catering, singing, sports, arts, etc. Zhang Guanzeng and others high-
light the pluralisation of public space for consumption, culture, and leisure
time. They satisfied the needs of citizens, (17) offered chances for socialising,
for the development of urban identity and civil society (with Chinese char-
acteristics). (18)
On the other hand, public space is an important economic resource in the
process of urban development. Following the logic of neoliberalism, devel-
opers, and investors, entrepreneurial local governments push for privatisa-
tion and commercialisation. (19) Besides improving retail profits, public places
may also enhance the image and worth of real estate objects and the city
in general. More than mere aesthetics, they are used to display prosperity,
modernity, and international sophistication to win over future investors and
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companies during the global and national competition between cities. (20)
Similar to Western experiences, only affluent users belong to the desired
target group, while non-consumers and other groups considered “inappro-
priate” are directly or indirectly excluded. As the production of these places
gains momentum in China, “publicness” is reduced in quantity and qual-
ity. (21)
Besides economic incentives, the production of space has a political di-
mension, especially in authoritarian China. Heike Holbig et al. emphasise
that the Communist Party’s legitimacy is based on both practical perform-
ance and convincing ideology. (22) The “political theatre” (23) at Tiananmen
Square in 1989 reinforced the regime’s caution and repression of open dis-
sent. Additionally, today’s public space has to convince and contribute to
the economic program of the Communist Party. Carolyn Marvin and others
have shown how hosting mega events such as the Olympic or Asian Games
leads to the production of “triumphalist space[s],” (24) combining financial
gain with pro-state ideology and distraction from social problems. (25) In
these public spaces profit and political prestige intertwine: a “theater in
which a pacified public basks in the [economic and political] grandeur of a
carefully orchestrated corporate spectacle.” (26) However, this spectacle is
not uncontested. Among other users, beggars claim public space for them-
selves and disturb the idealised version of government actors. 
Discourses on panhandling
When in the early 1980s the massive population movement from the
countryside to the cities began, beggars appeared within the discursive por-
trayal of rural migrants as illegitimate, dangerous, and criminal. The system
of “detention and repatriation,” which first concentrated on beggars, the
homeless, and “vagrants” (liulang) in 1982, eventually searched for prosti-
tutes, “criminal suspects,” and finally the “three without“ migrants – those
without proper ID, residence, or work certificates. (27) This built the basis for
sending unwelcome newcomers back to their hometowns immediately and
was a main pillar of the discriminating two-class system between city and
countryside. When a young student in Guangzhou died during detention in
2003, it revealed the system’s arbitrariness and brutality. A subsequent na-
tionwide media outcry demanded fundamental reforms. The detention cen-
tres were reorganised into “Rescue (Management) Stations” (28) offering help
only to a defined scope of vagrants, beggars, and homeless. Officially, the
system transformed “from forceful detention and repatriation to loving care
and service.” (29)
This change reflects the discourse on deserving, undeserving, and danger-
ous poor in China. On the one hand, the term “beggar” (qigai) connotes the
lowest level of poverty, materially as well as socially. (30) According to my
observations, common people give alms and show sympathy towards pan-
handlers in daily life and on social media. (31) Mistreatment is fiercely de-
bated and often seen as a sign of a China where culture and morality are
left behind. The problem of beggars becomes a litmus test of righteousness
for society and the state. Not only the 2003 incident, but also subsequent
considerations of local governments to restrict panhandling triggered vivid
public discussion. Intellectuals and scholars alike argued about administra-
tive arbitrary power and the rule of law, human rights, individual freedom,
and social security. (32) In this discourse arena, the State Council defines the
system of Rescue Stations as social relief. (33)
On the other hand, beggars stand outside the usual structures of social
control (family, neighbours, local government, etc.), which makes them sus-
picious and seemingly dangerous. Commonly combined with the term “va-
grant,” they likewise connotate flowing without aim, without commitments,
engaging in illegitimate and illegal activities. While panhandling in general
is not forbidden by law, forcing others (especially children) to panhandle
is. (34) This type of organised crime takes centre stage in government work
on beggars and strongly influences the assessment of panhandling as a se-
curity threat. Moreover, many reports and regulations emphasise beggars’
intrusive or deceiving behaviour as well as a trend of “professionalisation”
(zhiyehua). Guangzhou’s local Committee of the People’s Political Consul-
tative Conference pointed out: “[T]he number of those coming to the city
and panhandling because of poverty is decreasing, and the number of those
wanting to make money by panhandling who are idle, despise labour, and
love leisure is increasing; the trend of ‘professionalisation‘ becomes obvi-
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ous.” (35) The dichotomisation of deserving “real” and undeserving “profes-
sional” beggars is widely accepted among scholars and politicians. The latter
meaning oscillates between the afore-mentioned criminals and/or people
who refuse the help of the Rescue Stations (showing that they do not re-
quire any help), engage in panhandling as a long-term activity (in contrast
to a temporary emergency), are neither disabled nor too old (are therefore
able to work and in no need to beg for money), exaggerate their appearance
of misery (implying that there is no misery at all), and/or people from the
same native place who beg or live together (assuming an organised
“gang”). (36) The fraud also supposedly makes them rich, corresponding to
the well-known motto: “Bang your head on the floor in the city so you can
go home to build a house.” (37) Since the system changed in 2003,
Guangzhou’s politicians have claimed that the professionals take the lion’s
share among beggars, justifying unsympathetic governance. Ultimately, this
discourse on deserving, undeserving, and dangerous beggars has generated
a great impact on public space management, as their presence becomes a
sign of failure and a symbol of poverty, immorality, and managerial incom-
petence. In the words of various state actors in Guangzhou, acts of begging
threaten “social order” (shehui chengxu) (38) and reflect negatively upon the
“city environment” (shirong huanjing), the “city’s appearance” (chengshi
xingxiang), (39) and its international prestige. (40)
Background and reasons for panhandling
Needless to say, poverty or relative poverty are the main driving forces
behind panhandling. Underlying reasons for this poverty are numerous,
and the stories explaining them are individual. Yet they share common
features and are linked to the dynamic transformation of reform China.
The following short biographies give a first impression on family back-
ground, migration, and family history and the difficulties of surviving by
panhandling:
Mr. Bang lived most of his life in a village in Henan Province. He is now 71
years old, and his leg injury and general health have worsened. His wife
passed away 13 years ago and they did not have children. The only support-
ive family member remaining was his nephew, who is also unwell. Village
clan members could not be of much assistance, as they were elderly, while
the majority of young people migrated to the cities for work. The local state
offered little relief. Although he was theoretically eligible for care in a nearby
nursing home, the institution lacked the capacity to house him. He received
60 yuan in local welfare per month, but required 30 yuan per day on aver-
age, 10 yuan for medicine alone. His decision to escape the hard Henan
winter and migrate to Guangzhou was made rather spontaneously. The cli-
mate in Guangzhou is warmer than in Henan and the city is supposedly
richer, offering a good opportunity to earn extra money through panhan-
dling. After three months, he was not sure anymore. The symbols of wealth
were everywhere, such as fashionable people, houses, and cars, yet the few
yuan in his hand did not indicate a corresponding generosity on the part of
passersby. The money was enough to buy food, but it did not cover addi-
tional costs such as medicine or accommodation. Being new and on his own
in Guangzhou, he planned his return to Henan – hoping to finally acquire a
room at the nursing home. (41)
Contrarily, Mr. Mang became accustomed to a life on the move. Raised in
a village in Jilin Province, the 47-year-old man enthusiastically explained
his adventurous departure from home as a teenager, when in the early
1980s so many “came out” (chulai) for work. Migrating and working in var-
ious northern cities, he finally moved south and came to Guangzhou rou-
tinely throughout a decade. His left foot had been defective since birth,
making walking and standing difficult. He went into (illegal) street trade
and often struggled with the strict state management of public space. As a
shoeshine boy at the train station or as a motorcycle taxi driver, he earned,
saved, and invested money but finally lost his capital when his equipment
was seized by security staff. With increasing age, he began to panhandle and
since he was dissatisfied with Guangzhou, he thought about continuing his
wanderings. In this city, however, he was familiar with the surrounding in-
frastructure, including sleeping places, temples, informative acquaintances,
and donors: all important survival factors. His family’s role is small in his
life; his mother died when he was two years old and he had lost contact
with his father after leaving home. (42)
Mr. Gang, on the other hand, visits his parents and five siblings regularly
in their rural home in Shaoguang City (Guangdong Province). He is the only
family member who migrates for work, and being a little person in his twen-
ties, he wants to stand on his own two feet and “fight for myself” (ziji
fendou). The others had their own lives and could only offer temporary as-
sistance. Six years ago he conducted some trade, but when business went
bad he lacked the capital to continue. Instead, he partnered with a young
man who had lost his arm in an accident, but who was tall enough to be
seen and strong enough to trail a big speaker around. Together they pan-
handle relative lucratively by singing pop songs while walking along the
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streets. For Mr. Gang, this is a reasonable way of “continuing fighting” (jixu
fendou) for his own livelihood. (43)
These introductions and further research suggest that the typical beg-
gar profile combines three aspects of vulnerability. Mostly, they a) are
rural migrants, b) have limited work ability due to age, disability, or ill-
ness, and c) lack governmental and familial support in times of hard-
ship.
In respect of the first category, Tang Xiujuan’s survey on 135 beggars in
Guangzhou in 2007 found that 95% were rural migrants. In the current
study, all but one of the panhandling interviewees were from the country-
side. They migrate because of the growing wealth gap between regions and
between urban and rural areas. In contrast to urban citizens with residence
certificates (hukou), rural migrants are more likely to fall into a poverty trap.
They often work in low-paid jobs with increased health risks, lack social cap-
ital in the city (especially family), and are ineligible for urban social wel-
fare. (44) Conversely, panhandling can be the purpose of migration. While
beggars hope for wealthy and generous urbanites, the anonymity of the
cities provides freedom from judgment. Some beggars migrate to cities
solely on a seasonal basis, during agricultural low times or religious holi-
days. (45)
Regarding the second and third category, a survey ordered by Guangzhou’s
Rescue Stations in 2008 states “old age and/or physical disability” as the
main reasons for panhandling for 61% of the 300 interviewees. (46) In the
current study, physically challenged beggars accounted for 70%. The mo-
ment support is needed is often the moment when most beggars’ biogra-
phies change due to the unreliability of the family or state as pillars of
welfare. Guoxian Lu et al.’s survey in 2010 regarding 130 beggars in
Guangzhou and four other cities found that 69% of beggars were not mar-
ried and 46% did not have children (47) – an unusually high percentage for
China. Similarly, for my interviewees family was not a factor to count on:
parents were either too old or deceased, (48) while siblings or children were
unreliable and/or struggled themselves. (49) Panhandling is usually a sign of
not only individual but also familial poverty. Moreover, the interviewees in-
dicated that they were too ashamed to return to their hometowns without
having earned sufficient money. (50) They also did not dare to ask for help, (51)
or had been estranged throughout decades of migration. (52) Regarding gov-
ernmental welfare, rural migrants do not have access to urban services due
to the hukou system. In the countryside, the pension system, health insur-
ance, and the provision of comprehensive health care are still under con-
struction. Financial and medical support for the elderly and for physically
and mentally challenged people are also limited or unavailable. (53) The treat-
ment of illnesses and disabilities is complicated, and homecare institutions
are too expensive, overcrowded, non-existent or unknown. (54) Several inter-
viewees received financial support from their local government, mainly
within the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee program known as “dibao.” (55)
Claiming the payment as too low (55 to 100 yuan/month), they supplement
it with panhandling in the city. (56)
To make a living by begging on the streets is seldom a sudden decision, but
part of an extended struggle with poverty. Some beg for themselves, some
for loved ones. It can be a temporary or long-term activity; it can be combined
with other forms of money-making, and does not necessarily involve home-
lessness. Eight of the 22 interviewed beggars either rented independently or
shared inexpensive accommodation with family or acquaintances. Not every
beggar was equally “successful,” and the amount of daily alms was strongly
dependent upon both performance and access to public space.
Rescue stations, chengguan, and patterns of
public order 
Guangzhou’s Rescue Station system comes under the Bureau of Civil Af-
fairs and consists of two main stations (Tianhe, Luogang), three branches
in distant districts (Panyu, Zengcheng, Huadu) and a varying number of
“Mobile Rescue Service Teams.” However, this institution only plays a
small role in the governance of public space and the daily lives of beggars.
Firstly, the stations’ service is limited. It is not a place of daily refuge, but
for short-term emergencies. A beggar can receive medical attention, shel-
ter, and food for a maximum of ten days, twice a year, while the station
organises and funds the journey home. (57) For my interviewees this offer
is not attractive. It does not solve their long-term problems with poverty.
They left home for a reason, and being sent home only means having to
begin travelling anew. (58) Moreover, they prefer the freedom they are used
to and refuse the discipline within the station (i.e., being told when to get
up and go to bed, not to drink or smoke, etc.) (59) or remember times when
they were not allowed to leave. (60) According to the government survey
on 300 beggars mentioned above, 47% refused to go to a Rescue Sta-
tion. (61)
Secondly, the institution’s legal and personnel capacities are limited.
Not able to totally shake off their past, Guangzhou’s Rescue Stations un-
derstand their work as both social relief and management. (62) However,
the respective laws keep the target group small and only include people
who a) wander around or panhandle, b) are not able to take care of food
and shelter, c) have no relatives or friends to help, d) are not entitled to
the urban minimum allowance or the rural welfare for destitute house-
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holds. (63) This definition excludes most urban poor (64) and, according to
the above logic on “professionalism,” also most beggars frequently found
in public space. Moreover, the new regulations require the voluntary co-
operation of beggars. The stations cannot make them leave the city any-
more and the Mobile Rescue Teams cannot force beggars to come with
them. Patrols are allowed to inform and distribute leaflets, to “advise and
persuade” (quandao) and finally escort them to the stations. However,
most Mobile Teams are poorly staffed and are not a strong presence in
public space. (65)
To patrol the streets, the Stations depend on the cooperation of local po-
lice and especially chengguan, a common Chinese abbreviation for the
“Comprehensive City Management Enforcement Team.” It is the most visible
governmental security force in public space in Guangzhou. Chengguan takes
over the right of different municipal bureaus to control administrative delin-
quencies related to the cityscape, and are mainly known for dealing with
street peddlers. Given the great variety of chengguan’s tasks, additional co-
operation with the Rescue Stations is difficult. The 2012 commentary by
Guangzhou’s local committee of the People’s Political Consultative Confer-
ence states: “Since the system is flawed, responsibilities are unclear, coop-
eration is sluggish, and participation insufficient, our city’s Rescue and
Management work has not yet efficiently joined forces; the combined, com-
prehensive governance of the various divisions is ineffective.” (66)
However, with the increasing importance of city appearance and the ex-
pansion of chengguan tasks, panhandling was similarly framed as other
undesired usages of public space along with street vendors and illegal ad-
vertisement. (67) Although normally chengguan do not admit responsibility
for beggars, (68) this logic changes according to certain zones and periods.
As I argue elsewhere, the management of urban public space is locally
specific and rhythmic. With the growing popularity of a location, controls
are intensified, competences extended, and the presence of security per-
sonnel increased. They concentrate on so-called “key areas,” such as shop-
ping streets, theatres, parks, sightseeing spots, consulate areas, main traffic
axes, train stations, ports, etc. In interviews, chengguan patrol officers
highlighted concerns regarding traffic flow and described beggars as a pos-
sible hindrance or vulnerable traffic participants to explain the necessity
of expulsion. (69) However, the choice of places also reflects the desire to
present a positive image of the city to Chinese and foreign visitors. 
Moreover, control is enforced during seasonal or exceptional events such
as holidays, the city development campaigns “Hygienic City” and “Civilised
City,” or the Asian Games. These are also the times when patrols of the Res-
cue Stations make increased appearances, urging all beggars to leave (70) or
transporting them to the stations against their will. (71) The “Plan for Rescue
and Management during the Asian Games in Guangzhou in 2010” promised
a clear reduction of beggars in public space, (72) corresponding to similar
statements at the district level. Yuexiu’s Sub-bureau of Civil Affairs, for ex-
ample, was eager to “prevent the ‘backflow’ of homeless and beggars, pre-
serving the cleanliness of the ‘windows of the city’.” (73) With the
approaching Asian Games, the number of repatriated people rose from 97
in 2004 to 18,823 in 2009, and the times of “offering help” (gong jiuzhu) to
homeless and beggars more than doubled. (74) Of 36,082 cases of “offering
help” in 2010, 54% fell in the single month of the Asian Games (12 No-
vember to 20 December 2010). (75) Observation and conversations with beg-
gars during other time periods of control confirm the practice of increased
expulsion. It is this rhythm of governing public space that mainly influences
beggars’ access and performance strategies. 
Strategies of panhandling in consumption
and leisure-time areas
Shopping streets belong to the aforementioned key areas of stricter gov-
ernance. These hot spots are surrounded by several layers of lessening con-
trol with increasing distance. Therefore, begging techniques on shopping
streets are quite hidden; the more obvious performances can be found
around pedestrian borders and their wider vicinities. How long and freely
beggars can perform depends on the interference of security personnel, but
there is always a moment when they must vacate the scene. (76)
To be a successful beggar means to be authentic, often portraying a con-
vincing story of misery. The basics begin with appearance: poor, outworn
clothes, uncombed greasy hair, and generally dirty. (77) Some only sit around
in a stooped position. Stronger feelings of sympathy can be drawn by being
female, being/having a child, being very old, disabled, or ill, or having to take
care of such a person. Thus, many beggars expose their injuries, limbs, or
burned or diseased skin. Some might fake or exaggerate, sit half naked or
lie prone on a rolling board to increase the pitiful impression. Others display
a sick family member, shout, cry, and kowtow continuously and desperately
towards possible donors. The more convincing and extreme the misery por-
trayed, the less security personnel dare to intervene, afraid to draw attention
and disapproval of passersby or even worse, to provoke a scene covered by
the media. (78)
Other strategies explain begging as the result of a process in the context
of today’s socio-economic transformation, but lacking the direct political
implication. Writing on the pavement with chalk or putting up a poster,
adding pictures and certifications, they provide many convincing details
such as age, status, hometown, life path, and reasons for begging. (79) They
primarily indicate poverty due to rural origin and mostly talk about illnesses
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and medical fees, resulting deaths and unsuccessful treatment of themselves
or loved ones. Some add information on the difficult migration process and
the impossibility of finding a job. Their aims are simple and important: to
get by, to get well, and to go home. With that they refer to the known nar-
rative of the disadvantaged countryside and resulting migration as men-
tioned above, but offer a “happy ending,“ a plausible end to their hardship
should enough help be offered. 
To be in need is not enough – it has to be combined with moral integrity
to be deserving. Authenticity is supposed to mean honesty, and begging for
loved ones exhibits the virtue of piety. Panhandlers often seem modest, re-
frain from smoking or drinking, are polite and grateful when alms are given,
and some even kowtow to implicate the hierarchy between them and
donors. Compliments like “good people” (haoren) or “people with kind
hearts” (haoxinren) give donors a further positive self image, while well-
wishing brings to mind the religious logic that good deeds will be rewarded
someday. They address the pedestrians directly, calling them uncle, aunt,
older brother, etc., to “assert bonds of kinship with donors to override the
lack of social ties and stimulate compassion.” (80) Panhandlers appeal to, test,
and reassure the moral integrity of passersby.
The most effective “fashion” of panhandling strategies is to make oneself
heard. Many beggars play music from a tape, play instruments, or sing.
Equipped with microphones and effective speakers, they entertain pedes-
trians by playing popular love songs. The Erhu player (Chinese viola) or the
mobile music couple seem to be more traditional. First goes an old woman,
bending over with a bowl in hand or a bucket hanging from her neck. Behind
her follows a blind man, playing an Erhu, Sheng (a reed instrument), or har-
monica fixed onto a frame in front of his mouth and bells at his feet, jingling
with every step – a one man band. He also carries a little speaker hidden in
a bag. The melancholy music underpins their misery and ensures they are
not so easily overlooked, but rather are noticed and heard on the shopping
streets which are places of “renao,” of noise and excitement. 
Beggars are distributed over the wider area, as competition is bad for “busi-
ness,” and one’s own misery has to be the greatest. They do not only stick
out, but also fit in with the culture of entertainment in the city centre’s
consumption and leisure-time areas. Moreover, as the security system re-
strains access, beggars have to make maximum use of limited and uncertain
time and space, acting as efficiently as possible. The strictness of gover-
nance, the high competition for public space, and the audience’s attention
result in an enhancement of visible and audible effects and more elaborated
performances. 
Strategies for panhandling in religious
settings
Although communist rule dissolved the traditional structures between
temples and “beggar gangs” after 1949, (81) and institutional charity work
does not include beggars, (82) the latter still enjoy greater freedom at public
places near religious sites. Normally, neither chengguan nor other security
personnel bother them there. The special treatment in religious places be-
comes clear with the interesting case of the Dafo Temple, which is situated
between two side streets of the Beijing Lu pedestrian shopping area. When
asked about a beggar sitting at the temple’s archway, a chengguan officer
answered: “He belongs to the temple; this is not my concern.” (83) The num-
ber of beggars at religious sites rises with the number of visitors, according
to the rhythm of religious life. Guangxiao Si and the nearby Liurong Si, for
example, are among the most popular temples in Guangzhou and attract
about 30 beggars a day.
In contrast to leisure time areas, at religious sites beggars tend to sit in
groups. They often know each other and come regularly to these places,
some already for several years. (84) Filling the squares and paths in front and
around the religious sites, only a few consider the target group and give
themselves a religious air with a chanted “hallelujah” or a whispered “emi
tuofo,“ with Buddhist or Christian music. Most just wait for alms. At the Sa-
cred Heart Church, for example, after the mass has ended, believers swarm
out of the gates and only four of ten beggars stand up, holding out their
bowls. The others remain seated, talking. Compared with consumption and
leisure-time areas, their little effort to present a “show” is striking, but ex-
plainable: here donors are mostly believers, (85) and it becomes clear that
giving alms is part of the visiting process. Rather than being impressed by
performances of misery, they give because of (the appearance of) pious
duty and give automatically to more than one beggar. Mr. Mang explained
that it is important to become a regular at a place, as donors give more
readily to a familiar face. (86) On the other hand, the accessibility of these
locations is not restricted, and beggars do not need to perform efficiently.
At churches, they commute between the different houses and mass times.
At the temples, they spend the whole day, pile their belongings in the corner
and later sleep in the doorways or nearby. These are not only panhandling
but also living spaces. 
Increasing opportunities for beggars at temples and churches stand in the
context of the religious revival in China since the beginning of reforms. How-
ever, not only greater religious freedom and popular demand, but also the
intertwined economic and political interests of local governments play a
role, leading to a new development of religious sites. Since the 1990s, gov-
ernment propaganda selectively uses tradition to its own advantage, and
city governments present and rebuild local traditions and heritage spaces
in the process of city branding. (87) A good example is Guangzhou’s City God
Temple in the city centre. Once occupied by a factory, the Daoist location
was rebuilt in 2010. An impressive archway on the big front square directs
the view to the colourful monument right next to the Nanyue Palace Mu-
seum, where Guangzhou wishes to present its special position in history.
Beggars are nowhere to be seen and are not allowed by chengguan who are
in charge of the square. (88) Similarly, at temple fairs: blossoming in Imperial
and Republican China, scholars see them as the Chinese public space as they
gathered people from all walks of life – including beggars. (89) Today’s version
of the Yuexiu Temple Fair is advertised as traditional local culture, and ex-
pands from an arts and crafts market at the City God Temple to a food fes-
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tival near the Beijing Lu shopping street. The Boluo Temple Fair at the re-
mote Temple of the Southern Sea God offers more ready-made knick-
knacks, games, magic, and fortune telling. Both fairs are among the most
popular in Guangzhou and attract believers and non-believers alike. As re-
ligious sites transform into consumption and leisure-time areas that shape
and present the city image, they become places of economic and political
profitability. Thus, chengguan increase their controls, and deny access to
beggars. (90)
Conclusion
Urban panhandlers in China are children of the reform and open-door poli-
cies. The resulting imbalance between regions, countryside and city, and
non-urban and urban hukou regarding job opportunities, income and social
services produces high-risk groups that lack protection in times of hardship.
In the case of panhandlers, several misfortunes accumulate: they are mostly
rural migrants who are old, disabled, or ill, lacking both family support and
(sufficient) government assistance. They belong to the most deprived
among the urban poor. 
Besides higher-level rationales, this paper emphasised strategies of every-
day life and the spatial dimension. To make a living, beggars depend on the
“publicness” of a place, not only to have access themselves but to impress
a variety of possible donors. While performance is always part of successful
panhandling, it is also a way to contest for the resource of “public space.”
Beggars answer to a challenge of contrasting governmental legitimacy -
economic progress and strength versus responsibility and morality. In con-
sumption and leisure-time areas, their performances of authenticity and
deservingness refer to accepted reasons of vulnerability and moral behav-
iour, appealing to the integrity of those passing by and the chengguan.
Moreover, beggars fit into the culture of entertainment and compensate for
the short time and the less optimal position available due to government
restrictions. However, with increasing visible and audible effects, the finan-
cial and organisational investment in more elaborated performances rises
as well. While their exclusion is not absolute, the cost of appropriation in-
creases and the barriers of public space become stronger. Both denied access
and increased effort take resources from the panhandling poor. Ironically,
being concerned about trends of “professionalisation,” the rhythmical gov-
ernance according to zones and periods by Rescue Stations and chengguan
contributes to the logic that being poor and miserable is not enough any-
more to survive as a beggar.
How strong management and social function (religion, consumption, en-
tertainment) influence spatial appropriation by beggars shows the contrast-
ing example of religious sites. These are traditional gathering spots for
beggars due to the connection between charity and the salvation of believer.
While many Chinese find their way back to religion, beggars enjoy more
freedom as well and have to invest less in performance. As they are able to
stay all day, public space becomes not only a working but also a necessary
living space. However, when religious sites are claimed for profit and pres-
tige, exhibit history as proud and rooted and religion as a way of entertain-
ment and consumption, beggars are out of place again. 
The government’s focus becomes clear with the limited Rescue system
that “offers help” either by finally organising beggars’ departure from the
city or by urging them to leave visible spots. Moreover, chengguan is the
main actor dealing with beggars on the streets and follows the needs of the
city’s appearance. “Triumphalist spaces” are not exclusive to mega events
anymore but extend into everyday life, although to varying degrees, they
are produced for recurring city campaigns or holiday times, historical places,
and tourist areas and finally in common consumption and entertainment
settings. At the same time, governance according to zones and periods gives
an opportunity to catch a glimpse of the ideal public space in the eyes of
Guangzhou’s local government. Not only beggars are excluded but also
street vendors, street artists, political activists, and other forms of “chaos”
disturbing the image of a modern, wealthy, “hygienic,” “civilised,” and well
managed city. The economic incentives are unsurprising, considering the
capitalist logic prevailing in urban China. However, beggars display the neg-
ative side of the reforms and interfere with the spatial representation of a
successful transformation and harmonious society. Whether seen as vulner-
able and deserving of assistance or as undeserving and dangerous, beggars
are symbols of the poverty, immorality, instability, and incompetence of the
state. These were the arguments of Mao Zedong, who in the early years of
the People’s Republic declared that there was no place for the phenomenon
of panhandling in the “New China.” (91) Today, the communist leadership
cannot entirely turn its back on this logic. In the end, their solution aims
less at social relief than at taking the objective elements out of sight. The
exclusion of beggars is based on the desire of state actors to create “spaces
of representation” where economic profits merge with political prestige.
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